Delegation of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus to the CSTO PA consists of 7 deputies from the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus and 4 deputies from the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus.
Plenipotentiary representative of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus: Viktor Kogut
Website of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus: http://house.gov.by/en/
Website of the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus: http://www.sovrep.gov.by/ru/
Delegation of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the CSTO PA consists of 8 deputies from the Mazhilis of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan and 8 members of the Senate of the Parliament of Kazakhstan.
Plenipotentiary Representative of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, deputy Executive Secretary of the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly: Viktor Rogalev
Delegation of the Supreme Council of the Kyrgyz Republic to the CSTO PA consists of 6 deputies.
Plenipotentiary Representative of the Supreme Council of the Kyrgyz Republic: Shabdanbek Alishev
Website of the Supreme Council of the Kyrgyz Republic: http://www.kenesh.kg/
Delegation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation to the CSTO PA consists of 10 deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and 12 members of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation.
Plenipotentiary representative of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation - deputy Executive Secretary of the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly: Mikhail Krotov
Delegation of the Supreme Assembly of the Republic of Tajikistan to the CSTO PA consists of 6 deputies of the National Assembly of the Supreme Assembly of the Republic of Tajikistan and 6 deputies of the Assembly of Representatives of the Supreme Assembly of the Republic of Tajikistan.
Alisher Erbayev: CSTO is Not Only a Military, but a Political Shield for the Country
22 May 2025
Alisher Erbayev: CSTO is Not Only a Military, but a Political Shield for the Country
Interview with Alisher Erbaev, Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Law and Order, Combating Crime and Countering Corruption of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic
Mr. Erbayev, how effective is the cooperation with the CSTO in terms of improving combat readiness and technical equipment of Kyrgyz army?
In general, cooperation with the CSTO provides Kyrgyzstan with significant opportunities to improve the combat readiness of the army, which would be difficult to achieve solely with our own resources. It manifests itself in the training of personnel and the experience gained from joint operations. However, the extent of this effectiveness depends on a variety of factors, including the consistency of implementation of joint programs, the availability of necessary resources, and the ability to adapt the acquired experience and equipment to national realities and needs.
Cooperation brings a certain degree of unification of weapons and standards that simplifies interoperability and logistics within the collective force.
The regular participation of units of the Armed Forces of Kyrgyzstan in joint CSTO exercises of various levels (e.g., Rubezh, Nerushimoye bratstvo, etc.) is an important factor in improving combat readiness. These military exercises are aimed to improve interoperability with contingents of the other Member States; to coordinate headquarters and troops in joint operations; to master modern forms and methods of combat operations, including operations against terrorist formations and responding to hybrid threats.
Of course, it's important to point out that the effectiveness of these activities depends on the quality of their planning, the scale of Kyrgyz participation and the subsequent introduction of the gained experience into daily combat training.
Kyrgyzstan's participation in the formation and training of the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (CRRF), the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of the Central Asian Region (CRDF CAR) and the CSTO Peacekeeping Forces incentivizes the maintenance of these units at a high level of combat readiness and their equipment in accordance with certain standards. Having such forces and mechanisms for their deployment (as demonstrated, for example, by the CSTO “operation” in Kazakhstan in January 2022) shows the CSTO's potential in responding to crisis situations, which indirectly contributes to strengthening the defence capabilities of each Member State. At the same time, the matters of rapid deployment, decision-making and actual combat capability of these forces in various scenarios still need continuous attention and improvement.
What contribution has Kyrgyzstan made to the joint CSTO military exercises and programs over the past year?
Our Republic regularly sends its units (motorized rifle, special and other units) to participate in various CSTO exercises, both on our territory and in other Member States. This includes such exercises as Rubezh (with the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of the Central Asian Region, CRDF CAR), Nerushimoye bratstvo (with the CSTO Peacekeeping Forces), Poisk (with the intelligence forces and assets), Vzaimodeistvie (with the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces, СRRF), Echelon (logistics forces and assets).
Without a doubt, our contribution is not only in providing personnel and equipment, but also in practicing joint actions and exchanging combat experience. We also provide our territory for holding relevant CSTO military exercises. For example, the unique Edelweiss mountain range, which occasionally serves as a training ground for the joint CSTO exercises. This is a significant contribution to the practical training for performing tasks in difficult conditions typical for the Central Asian region.
It's absolutely worth to mention the officers of the Armed Forces of the Republic, who actively take part in the work of joint staffs and command posts during the military exercises, as well as in the work of the CSTO Joint Staff on a permanent basis, contributing to the planning and coordination of the Collective Forces.
Kyrgyzstan allocates designated subunits to the СRRF, CRDF CAR and the CSTO Peacekeeping Forces, maintaining their combat readiness and readiness for deployment in accordance with the Organization's plans.
How important do you consider Kyrgyzstan's membership in the CSTO in terms of national security and sovereignty?
Its geographical position puts Kyrgyzstan at a certain disadvantage in terms of security, and given our limited resources, our membership in the CSTO is an important factor in ensuring national security. It provides collective defence guarantees, a platform for cooperation in combating common threats, and opportunities to strengthen defence capabilities. Article 4 of the Collective Security Treaty states that if one of the Member States undergoes aggression, it will be considered by the Member States as aggression to all the Member States. This provision is a guarantee of collective defence and a deterrent against potential external threats to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kyrgyzstan. In addition, the CSTO states that its goal is to fight against international terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking, cross-border organized crime and other challenges that are pressing for the Central Asian region.
However, as for any member state of a political and military alliance, the issue of balancing between the alliance commitments and national interests & sovereign rights remains relevant for our Republic. The effectiveness of membership largely depends on the country's ability to actively participate in shaping the Organization's agenda, defend its interests and use the CSTO mechanisms to strengthen both its own and regional security, while retaining sovereign control over the key decisions about defence and foreign policy.
Many experts claim that the CSTO is not only a military alliance, but also a political instrument. Do you agree with this, and what benefits does Kyrgyzstan gain from political cooperation within the organization?
Yes, I agree with the experts' claim that the CSTO is not only a military alliance, but also a powerful political instrument. Originally established to address collective defence objectives, the Organization has evolved over time, and its political component has become more and more prominent. The CSTO provides a platform for regular dialogue between heads of state, defence ministers and secretaries of security councils on key security and foreign policy issues. It helps to increase mutual understanding and develop common approaches.
Through political interaction within the CSTO, we work towards reaching a common understanding of threats and security interests, which strengthens the alliance.
After the events in Kazakhstan in 2022, many people reassessed the CSTO's capabilities. In your opinion, is the Organization really ready to defend its members in case of a real threat?
The events in Kazakhstan in January 2022 indeed set a significant precedent and became a “test of strength” for the CSTO, giving rise to a wave of discussions about its real capabilities and readiness to defend its members. These events demonstrated CSTO's ability to rapidly deploy forces and means. The Organization showed its ability to take political decisions rapidly and deploy Collective Peacekeeping Forces at the request of a Member State to stabilize internal situation and protect key strategical facilities. This was the first real deployment of CSTO's Collective Forces.
The decision was taken promptly, which shows that the Member States possess a certain political will to act together in a crisis, when leaders of one of the states request assistance.
It is important to note that the mission in Kazakhstan was declared as a peacekeeping operation, with tasks limited to protecting facilities and assisting in restoring order, and not as an operation for collective defence against external aggression. I would like to highlight that CSTO troops were not involved in combat actions against the protesters.
How efficient is CSTO's response system to challenges in Central Asia, including on the borders of Kyrgyzstan?
The efficiency of CSTO's response system to challenges in Central Asia, including on Kyrgyzstan's borders, is a subject of constant analysis and discussions. It is difficult to limit its evaluation to just “high-efficient” or “low-efficient”, as it has not really manifested itself anywhere yet, except for the events in Kazakhstan.
As I have already mentioned, the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of the Central Asian Region (CRDF CAR) regularly carry out the Rubezh military exercises to practice joint actions to localize and neutralize armed conflicts, including border conflicts, and, in particular, to counter terrorist threats. In this context, it is also worth mentioning the Kant airbase, located in the Kyrgyz Republic and used by the Russian Federation within the CSTO as a component of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of the Central Asian region. Its forces and means are designed for rapid transfer of troops and providing air support to CRDF CAR units in case there are threats in the Central Asian region.
Apart from CRDF CAR, other CSTO exercises, such as Vzaimodeistvie, Nerushimoye bratstvo and Poisk, are often held on the territory of Central Asian states or according to scenarios relevant to the region. These actions increase interoperability and readiness for joint action.
The CSTO has consultation and decision-making mechanisms in case of crisis situations threatening the security of one or several Member States.
How would you assess participation of Kyrgyz servicemen in joint peacekeeping missions and exercises of the CSTO?
The participation of Kyrgyz servicemen in joint peacekeeping missions and exercises of the CSTO can be assessed as an important aspect of their professional training and the country's contribution to collective efforts to maintain peace and stability in the Organization's area of responsibility.
Peacekeeping exercises (for example, Nerushimoye bratstvo) allow our servicemen to practice specific tasks, such as patrolling, serving at checkpoints, escorting humanitarian cargo, negotiating, dealing with civil unrest and protecting civilians. This is a valuable experience, different from traditional general military training.
During preparation and execution of peacekeeping operations, servicemen deepen their knowledge of international humanitarian law and rules on the use of force in peacekeeping operations.
Moreover, participation in scenarios simulating real peacekeeping operations contributes to the psychological training of personnel, teaching them to act in a complex and tense situation.
What is also worth noting is that undergoing exercises side by side with servicemen from other CSTO states helps improving mutual understanding, coordination and interoperability at the operational and tactical levels. They also practice unified procedures and standards.
Which priorities should the Kyrgyz Republic set within the framework of future cooperation with the CSTO?
Given the complex geopolitical situation, regional threats and challenges I mentioned, as well as national interests of the Kyrgyz Republic, I would like to highlight the need to strengthen our capacity to counter typical cross-border threats in Central Asia. Namely, we need to improve joint mechanisms for countering international terrorism, religious extremism and drug trafficking, with special emphasis on the threats emanating from Afghanistan.
We should develop particular scenarios and algorithms for actions of the CSTO Collective Forces, taking into account the experience of previous operations and specific features of potential crises in Central Asia.
I believe it is necessary to make the most of military educational institutions of CSTO states to train and retrain officers and sergeants of the Kyrgyz Armed Forces in demanded fields (for example, specialists in UAVs, electronic warfare, cybersecurity and mountain training). To do this, it is necessary to expand training quotas, adapt domestic training programs to the needs of a modern army and actively exchange experience we gain during exercises and peacekeeping operations.
We should also aspire for and actively work on obtaining modern samples of weapons and military equipment, as well as technologies that best meet the needs of the Kyrgyz Armed Forces, on the most favorable terms possible.
In the context of changing world geopolitics, should Kyrgyzstan reconsider the format of its participation in the CSTO, strengthening or weakening its involvement?
Despite all the discussions about its applicability, Article 4 of the Collective Security Treaty remains an important deterrent and a potential support in case of grave external aggression. For a state with limited military resources, this can be crucial.
Simply “weakening” engagement can be risky, as it is the case with passively following current format with no adaptation to changing situation. The most practical approach for Kyrgyzstan would most likely involve continuing its active but pragmatic and proactive participation in the CSTO, aimed at making the most of the Organization's advantages to ensure its own security, while developing other areas of security cooperation and defending its national interests within the CSTO. Any corrections of the course should be carefully measured and aimed at strengthening national security and sovereignty of the state in the long term.
In your opinion, which role should the parliaments of the CSTO Member States play in strengthening dialogue and civil control over the Organization's activities?
I see the development of the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly (CSTO PA) in the CSTO PA's transition from a primarily consultative body into a platform for real decision-making on pressing collective security issues.
Adopted model laws should be better promoted to be implemented at the national level.
There is no doubt that the parliaments of CSTO states play an integral role in the ratification of treaties and agreements concluded within the CSTO, which represents the main form of control. This process should be accompanied by a thorough study and discussion of commitments taken on by the state.
In addition, the parliaments of CSTO Member States can contribute to greater transparency in the CSTO's activities by initiating public discussions, round tables and conferences with the participation of civil society, NGOs and independent experts.
It is worth noting that parliamentarians can play an important role in explaining the CSTO's goals, objectives and activities to voters, helping establish an adequate public opinion about the Organization and reduce possible fears.
In conclusion, I would like to mention some “special” political features of the CSTO Member States that have influenced and are still influencing the processes of strengthening dialogue and civil control over the organization's activities. First, the difference in levels of development of parliamentarism and democratic institutions in the CSTO Member States. Second, the traditionally reserved nature of security and defence sphere. Third, the prevalence of the executive branch in decision-making regarding foreign policy and security issues in most Member States.
Nevertheless, strengthening the parliamentary dimension of the CSTO and increasing the role of national parliaments in civil control and dialogue is an important step to enhance the legitimacy and efficiency of the Organization, as well as to adapt it to modern challenges that require broader public support and understanding.