Today, on May 15, the Collective Security Treaty celebrates its 28th year; the CSTO its 18th

he Collective Security Treaty Organization dates back to the conclusion of the Collective Security Treaty signed in Tashkent (the Republic of Uzbekistan) on May 15, 1992 by the Heads of the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan.
It was later joined by the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Georgia (1993). The Treaty entered into force upon completion of the national ratification procedures on April 20, 1994.
The key Article 4 of the Treaty states: “If an aggression is committed against one of the States Parties by any state or a group of states, it will be considered as an aggression against all the States Parties to this Treaty. In case an act of aggression is committed against any of the States Parties, all the other States Parties will render it necessary assistance, including military one, as well as provide support with the means at their disposal through an exercise of the right to collective defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.”
In 1999, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed the Protocol on the Extension of the Collective Security Treaty, which established a new composition of Member States and an automatic five-year extension procedure (Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan terminated their Treaty membership).
On May 14, 2002 in Moscow, the Collective Security Council decided to give the Collective Security Treaty the status of an international regional organization.

On October 7, 2002, the CSTO Charter was approved. 
On June 23, 2006, the CSTO CSC Minsk session defined the need to pursue the parliamentary dimension of the CSTO within the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly.
Based on that decision of the CSTO CSC and the IPA CIS Convention, the chairpersons of parliaments of the CIS nations that are members of the CSTO adopted a resolution on the establishment of the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly (CSTO PA) at their session of November 16, 2006.
On November 24, 2016, Vyacheslav Volodin, Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation of the 7th convocation, was elected Chairman of the CSTO PA.
On November 5, 2019, Vyacheslav Volodin was re-elected Chairman of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

On the day of the 28th anniversary of the Treaty on Collective Security and the 18th anniversary of the CSTO, Stanislav Zas, the Organization’s Secretary General, gave an interview to RIA Novosti in which he spoke about the current situation, tasks and prospects of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

Stanislav Zas: There is no threat of military conflict between the CSTO and NATO

Interview with RIA Novosti, 11:00 AM, 15.05.2020
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has been active for 18 years already. This largest military and political bloc includes six countries: Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. CSTO’s Secretary General Stanislav Zas, who took office early this year, in his first interview to the media told RIA Novosti’s Elena Protopopova whether there is a threat of a military conflict between the CSTO and NATO, what are the Organization’s achievements and expansion prospects, and also how the bloc is fighting the coronavirus pandemic and will the military and political situation change in the post-epidemic world.
—    The CSTO can be congratulated with the coming of age: on May 15, the Collective Security Treaty Organization turns 18. But the Collective Security Treaty itself was signed back in 1992, while the Organization was established 10 years later. What is your take on the role and significance of the CSTO in the world in ensuring international security within its area of responsibility?
—    The CSTO is now a fully-fledged international organization. And there is every reason for such a statement. The necessary regulatory framework has been put in place to enable the work of the Organization, the necessary material and human resources have been drawn up to address the tasks that the CSTO is facing. There is a management and support system that includes a joint material and human resource training system, a personnel training system and so on. The goals of the CSTO are to build peace, strengthen international and regional security and stability, collectively protect the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Member States.
The CSTO has established a strong military component: bilateral regional groups, the Collective Rapid Deployment Force (CRDF) of the Central Asian Region, the Collective Rapid Reaction Force, the Peacekeeping Force and the Collective Air Force. Every year, we conduct six to eight different military and special exercises. International operations are carried out in the area of combating challenges and threats within the CSTO format: the anti-drug operation Kanal (“channel” in Russian), operation Nelegal (“illegal person”) against illegal migration, counter-terrorism operation Naemnik (“mercenary”) and others. In general, the CSTO’s military capabilities are sufficient to address the tasks at hand. But we certainly give priority to political means. This is prescribed by Article 3 of our Organization’s Charter. And I would like to stress it.
The CSTO has taken its place in the system of international organizations, structures and unions dealing with security issues. We work closely with UN bodies, primarily in matters of countering terrorism and drugs, as well as in matters of peacekeeping. We cooperate well with the OSCE. We enjoy partnerships with the CIS and SCO, we have good relations with the International Red Cross. In other words, the CSTO has integrated into the international security system and we have occupied our niche.
Some may say “but your alliance has not fought anywhere”, but that is good. There is stability in the CSTO area of responsibility and such incidents have been prevented. This already indicates that the Organization is fulfilling its tasks. If we allowed military actions, it would mean that we have failed our main mission. Now and in the future, the Organization will be able to provide a guaranteed response to any attempts to destabilize the situation, violate peace and security in its area of responsibility. Today the situation in the CSTO area of responsibility is much more stable than in many other regions of the world. This is the achievement of each of our states individually and of the Organization as a whole.
—    Can this stability and robustness of the Organization attract new members?
—    Certainly. This is one of the Organization’s attractive features. We have reached a stage now when we launch a CSTO partner and observer mechanism. We hope that organizations and countries will legally become our partners and observers. The groundwork has been practically laid. Already now, there are many friendly countries and organizations. And now the statutory documents on introduction of CSTO observers and partners have been adopted and the parliaments are finalizing the ratification process of these legislative changes. All states, except Tajikistan, have completed ratification. We look forward to this step by Tajikistan. After that, it will be possible to proceed to the next stage of the formation of a belt of good-neighbourly relations. This, by the way, will be one of the issues of the forthcoming CSTO Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM): to consider further steps towards the implementation of the CSTO partner and observer status.
The CSTO observer status provides for the opportunity to study the available legal framework of the Organization and its experience and practice, to attend meetings of the CSTO bodies and events held within the CSTO. A CSTO partner is granted broader mandate, including, in particular, the right to accede to international treaties concluded within the CSTO framework, to participate and speak in an advisory capacity at meetings of the Organization’s bodies, to take direct part in exercises of the collective security system involving military equipment and personnel, as well as in tactical and preventive operations. At the same time, in accordance with the adopted documents, potential partner and observer states must meet the following criteria: be a member of the UN, have diplomatic relations with all CSTO Member States, while potential partners in addition to it must not be in a state of armed conflict with other states.
—    Whom do you see as a first observer or partner? Has any country already applied?
—    It is too early for applications because the ratification is not over yet. When we are done with the ratification, we will have the full legal right to put this format into practice. Of course, there are plans and we are excited about it. I talked about it at the meeting with the heads of state and foreign ministers when I was in Armenia and Belarus. We discussed this with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Unfortunately, the visits to other countries have been cancelled. But we will come back to it. We discussed our possible partners and observers. This conversation will continue at the meeting of the CSTO CFM, which will be held on May 26 by videoconference.
—    So, are there specific candidates who want to obtain the status? For instance, Uzbekistan that used to be a CSTO member until 2012 – can it become a member once again?
—    Article 19 of the CSTO Charter stipulates that “membership of the Organization is open to any State which shares its purposes and principles and is prepared to undertake the obligations set forth in this Charter and other international treaties and decisions which are in effect within the framework of the Organization.” But we must be very careful and approach the expansion of the military and political bloc in a balanced and cautious manner. I think it is also a possibility. But it is not an immediate issue. The bloc’s expansion can and should be carried out with the engagement of partners and observers, an institution which is currently on the agenda.
Since Uzbekistan has been specifically mentioned, I will say more in my own capacity. I know this beautiful country very well and I know what dynamic and progressive changes are taking place there. The country has excellent prospects. It has good relations with all CSTO Member States and has experience working as part of our bloc. Uzbekistan fully meets the criteria I have mentioned. If Tashkent is interested in this, we can discuss various interaction modalities, considering, among other things, the opportunities provided by the status of a CSTO partner and observer.
— On May 9 we all celebrated the 75th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War. Unfortunately, due to the coronavirus pandemic, there was no traditional parade on Red Square, only its aeronautical component. Before the pandemic, it was reported that military units of the CSTO countries would take part in the traditional Victory Parade on Red Square. The parade has been postponed. Does participation in the parade, which will take place at another time, remain valid?
— All the CSTO countries were making great efforts to prepare for the May 9 celebration. It is a great national holiday for all of us. All the more so because it is a round-number anniversary this year. In commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the Great Victory, all CSTO Member States pay tribute to veterans and salute those who gave up their lives for the freedom and independence of their Motherland, fought valiantly for Moscow and Leningrad, Kiev and Minsk, Stalingrad and Kursk, the Baltic States and Moldova, liberated the countries of Europe and took Berlin.
But, as we can see, the pandemic has changed things. The Moscow parade has been postponed as well. In preparation for it, indeed, all CSTO states have confirmed their readiness to send their military units to the Moscow parade. And their training was organized in the national capitals. I am sure that the parade will take place. The date will depend on the situation. The decision, of course, will be made by the leadership of the Russian Federation. In my opinion, at least two dates can be considered: June 24, when the very first parade took place in 1945; it would be symbolic. And if the epidemiological situation allows it, it would be great. Or we could consider early September, the day when the Second World War ended. That would be symbolic as well. There could be other dates, of course. I repeat: Russian leadership will decide on the parade’s timing and format.
Of course, neither did we ignore May 9. All our countries paid tribute to fallen soldiers and veterans. All the heads of CSTO states expressed their congratulations on this great holiday. And the CSTO was not left without a military parade. A full military parade with military equipment was held in the Hero City of Minsk, the capital of Belarus, and air parades were held in 47 cities of the Russian Federation and its military bases, including those comprising the CSTO collective security system: in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. And in the evening, Moscow, Minsk and Bishkek let off festive fireworks.
— What do you think about rhetoric in the West that deliberately ignores the role of the Soviet Union in the defeat of fascism?
— You know, the USA and European countries express different views on the role of the USSR in the victory. Along with ridiculous lies there are also fair and true statements – expressed at the highest level. But, unfortunately, there are attempts to review the results and causes of the war and the role of the USSR in defeating fascism in this war. Among other things, there are those who accuse the USSR, along with Germany, of starting this war. These are nothing but lies.
Of course, such challenges require a response. And both Russia and other CSTO states chose a most proper tactics: to resist falsification of history with the help of official documents, archival photos and films. To use not rhetoric but facts. This way, it is difficult to argue with the historical truth. Those who want it, certainly can continue to shout, but there must be arguments still.
It is important to fight it; it is important to remember; it is important to keep raising awareness about the contribution of the USSR to the victory over fascism. We preserve the memory of the heroism of our peoples and consider it our sacred duty to defend the historical truth about the Great Patriotic War, to stop attempts to rewrite history and glorify fascism. A special section has been added to the CSTO website entitled 75th Anniversary of Victory: We Have Won Together which contains a virtual photo exhibition of the contribution of the CSTO Member States (former Soviet republics) to the victory over Nazi Germany and publishes materials on the deeds of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War from all CSTO Member States.
As part of Russia’s CSTO presidency, we are actively cooperating with the Russian Foreign Ministry to promote truthful content about the war. Our information resource Allies.CSTO has prepared and published more than 35 such articles and reports during the four months of this year. A banner dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the Victory has been put up on the CSTO Joint Headquarters building in Moscow. And it is symbolic, because in the early morning of May 9, 1945, the Act of Military Surrender of Germany was delivered from the defeated Berlin to this place, 41 Leningradsky Prospekt, where the Moscow airfield was located at that time.
On the eve of Victory Day, the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly adopted an Address to the Parliaments of the Council of Europe Member States on the Occasion of the 75th anniversary of the Victory over Nazism in the Second World War, in which it called for the adoption of legislative measures to counter the resurgence and promotion of Nazism and its manifestations in modern Europe, to protect the historical truth about the Second World War and to prevent attempts to revise its results and belittle the decisive role of the peoples of the Soviet Union in the victory.
— How are the CSTO countries cooperating in combating the coronavirus pandemic? How does the Organization itself survive the pandemic, are there any employees infected with COVID-19?
— The pandemic is a very serious threat for our countries. It is not fully the CSTO’s competence, after all we are a military and political organization. But, nevertheless, we do not stay out of this threat. From the very beginning, when the pandemic was just starting, I had a conversation with Anna Popova, head of Rospotrebnadzor. We established then that should the need arise, the CSTO, being a military and political organization, will fully leverage its capacity to fight the pandemic. So far, it has not been necessary.
I discussed the coronavirus situation on the phone with secretaries of security councils of CSTO Member States. We exchanged views on the current situation and measures taken to combat the pandemic in each CSTO Member State. We also agreed to continue consultations to develop collective response measures in case the situation in the CSTO area of responsibility rapidly deteriorates.
As part of preventive measures, the capacities of the CSTO Crisis Response Centre are being utilized, close cooperation has been organized with the CSTO Member States’ ministries and agencies, and the spread of coronavirus infection in collective security regions is being monitored on a daily basis.
In April, Crisis Response Centre held unscheduled remote consultations with the heads of military medical services of CSTO Member States’ defence agencies. At the session, Russian experts presented the latest developments in the prevention and treatment of COVID-19 infection and shared the experience gained in providing assistance in Italy and Serbia.
New realities brought by the pandemic that are now emerging in CSTO’s area of responsibility will be considered during the upcoming May 26 meeting of the CSTO CFM.
Of course, the pandemic is a new threat. But CSTO’s legal framework makes it possible to respond to such a threat. The existing legal framework and the existing system make it possible to respond to a pandemic.
—    What assistance did the CSTO countries provide to each other to fight the pandemic?
—    The CSTO legal framework provides for such emergency assistance mechanisms. We are ready for it, we know the situation in all our states, we update data every day. Within the framework of the CSTO there are mechanisms for providing assistance, if requested. There is a bilateral-assistance option, when a state applies directly to another one for assistance and receives it. There is an option when several CSTO states provide consolidated assistance to another member of the Organization. The second option proved unnecessary. Assistance was provided through bilateral contacts.
—    How is CSTO staff faring in the pandemic?
—     Of course, we have taken counter-pandemic measures in Moscow. Back in March, the first thing we did, even before the authorities announced such measures, was to send home all employees over 60 to work remotely. These few people are distinguished and experienced professionals. They have been working like this since then.
The CSTO working bodies – the Secretariat and the CSTO Joint Staff – are working according to a special plan, following a coronavirus prevention decree. A set of antiviral measures has been designed and is being implemented. As far as practical measures are concerned, business travels of the staff have been temporarily cancelled. Special procedures have been introduced and we decided to refrain from holding events in the Secretariat and CSTO Joint Staff buildings with the participation of representatives of the CSTO Member States and to stop travels outside Moscow for the personnel of the Secretariat and the CSTO Joint Staff. Most of the staff have now been transferred to remote work. A minimum number of employees are coming to work. No face-to-face meetings are held; we use video communication.
The measures taken allowed us to minimize the probability of coronavirus infection of our employees and their families. Today they are all capable of performing their tasks. Fortunately, no-one has been infected yet. But we keep on top of it and stay sharp.
— Have you already held talks remotely? What kind of platform do you use? How secure is it?
— That is a good question. Of course, we consider the issue of security when we hold events online. For example, we are now communicating with you, and at the same time there is a meeting of the Organization’s Standing Council going on as a video conference. Unclassified issues and documents are being discussed there. There is also a secure system for video conferencing with all our states at the CSTO Crisis Response Centre.
— Since taking office, you have already met the Presidents of Russia and Belarus, as well as the Prime Minister of Armenia. What have you discussed? What tasks have they set for you?
— I discussed a wide range of current issues of the Organization’s activity with the heads of state. They were informed about the implementation of the decisions of the November (2019) session of the Collective Security Council and CSTO statutory bodies, as well as about the start of the implementation of the priority tasks proposed by Russia for the period of its presidency in the Organization. In the course of the talks, all the steps aimed at strengthening the CSTO and increasing its effectiveness in the interests of all Member States received support. One such step is to expand foreign-policy activities, strengthen cooperation with international organizations and interested countries. The corresponding decision regarding the CSTO partners and observers, as I have already said, has been made. We need to define the candidates, to conduct addressed work and form a belt of good-neighbourly relations around our military and political bloc.
We attach great importance to the development of political cooperation in the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly format. Currently, Serbia and Afghanistan are the Assembly’s partners in inter-parliamentary relations. The plan is to continue the work on expanding such ties.
During the meetings we have also discussed the development prospects of military equipment and personnel of the collective security system and improvement of the crisis-response system. We have prepared the 2021–2025 CSTO Member States’ Military Cooperation Development Plan to be submitted to the statutory bodies.
We have discussed the military component and specifically the combat training of the Collective Forces. In 2020, we plan to conduct a number of joint exercises, the most important of which are: command and staff exercise Vzaimodeistvie-2020 (“interaction 2020”) with the CSTO CRDF; reconnaissance exercise Poisk-2020 (“search 2020”) in Armenia; command and staff exercise involving the CSTO peacekeeping force Unbreakable Brotherhood 2020 in Belarus; Kobalt 2020 exercise involving special units of the CSTO CRDF in Tajikistan.
A set of measures to counter security challenges and threats was also discussed with the heads of state.
The Collective Action Plan of CSTO Member States provides for joint activities in the area of preventing and combating terrorism. A set of anti-terrorist preventive operations codenamed Naemnik (“mercenary”) is planned.
An anti-drug operation Kanal (“channel”) will also be conducted. Together with the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the CSTO Secretariat is developing a draft CSTO Member States’ Anti-Drug Strategy for 2021–2025.
In addition, operation Nelegal (“illegal person”) to suppress illegal migration and operation Proxy to combat IT crimes are planned.
Another area of activity is CSTO peacekeeping capacity building for the benefit of the United Nations. Issues related to the practical involvement of the units of the CSTO peacekeeping force in the United Nations peacekeeping operations are currently being considered with the relevant United Nations committees. At the same time, there is a need to establish a Basic Centre for peacekeeping-unit training according to the United Nations’ standards.
We attach great importance to the development of military and economic cooperation with the CSTO Member States. We intend to work actively in that area.
Plans to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War were also discussed. This is one of the most important events this year. Once again, I would like to reiterate that it is necessary to uphold the truth about the victory, to oppose all attempts to falsify history. This is one of the main goals of our work.
Overall, these meetings are very important for the fruitful work of both the CSTO Secretariat and all bodies of the Organization. Unfortunately, due to the coronavirus pandemic, meetings with the leadership of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been postponed. But I am confident that all meetings will take place and will contribute to the improvement of CSTO’s effectiveness.
— The pandemic, as you said, has changed the work of the CSTO. Did it influence the schedule of exercises of the CSTO states that were planned before the pandemic?
— It is necessary to understand the importance of the exercises. This is the supreme form of preparation of the armed forces and law-enforcement agencies for joint actions. We hope that we will be able to conduct most of them, if not all. There were plans to conduct eight joint exercises of the CSTO states. All of them are planned for September and October. Traditionally, they are always held during this period. So far, we have not cancelled them and the preparations are on schedule. We will, of course, proceed from the situation. If it becomes favourable, we will conduct the exercises as planned. If there are real threats to livelihoods and wellbeing of the participants of the exercises, we will have to postpone them.
— And how do you assess the current level of interaction between the armed forces and other security agencies within the CSTO?
— I assess it as very high. In the 18 years since the establishment of the CSTO, a lot of work has been done to strengthen the interaction of all security agencies of our states. From interacting on separate tasks, usually on a bilateral basis, we have reached a higher level: of multilateral comprehensive interaction of the armed forces and other security agencies.
This can be clearly seen in the example of military cooperation. We started from working out a regulatory cooperation framework, from separate cooperative events of the armed forces and the creation of regional groups on a bilateral basis.
Today, we are already on a completely different level of interaction. In 2004, the CSTO Joint Staff was formed to coordinate military cooperation to address all practical tasks related to the formation, functioning and use of collective security equipment and personnel. The CSTO collective forces were further developed, and in 2009, the CRDF was formed, which includes the most combat-ready formations and units of the armed forces and special forces. A CSTO collective force training system has been developed, with special attention paid to the CRDF training.
Joint operational and combat training activities and joint exercises are conducted annually. This is an important and effective mechanism for improving cooperation. The operational and strategic exercise Combat Brotherhood is conducted against a common military and political backdrop and according to a common plan. At the same time, as part of this exercise with the CSTO CRDF, a joint exercise codenamed Vzaimodeistvie (“interaction”), an exercise with the Collective Rapid Deployment Force of the Central Asian Region titled Rubezh (“frontier”) and Unbreakable Brotherhood, an exercise with the CSTO peacekeeping force, are conducted every year. Kobalt exercise is regularly conducted with the special forces of the CSTO CRDF. In 2019, about 12,000 people took part in all these exercises.
An integral part of the interaction between the armed forces and other security agencies of our countries is the joint training system. As part of the specialist training and retraining, annually about 1,500 people from CSTO Member States study at the universities of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Emergency Situations and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation on preferential terms or free of charge. Under similar conditions, students and cadets from the CSTO states are trained at the specialist universities in Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
An important area of cooperation between the armed forces and other security agencies is military and technical cooperation, within the framework of which we have already reached the level of establishing interstate programs. The mechanisms of providing the CSTO Member States with emergency military and technical assistance are being improved.
At the same time, it is too early to say that everything has been done. Life itself forces us to go further, to improve and increase military cooperation, to work out new collective-security mechanisms. In particular, we have already begun establishing joint military systems in information, intelligence and other areas. This is a prospect and this is a new level of cooperation.
— Taking into account the coronavirus epidemic, will any of the exercises be redesigned and conducted in order for the CSTO forces to practice methods of fighting such dangers as a pandemic, a biological threat?
— The CSTO’s purpose and objectives have not changed, so there is no need to redesign the exercises. But some focal points of the conducted exercises will be readjusted. And this is a priority for the CSTO Joint Staff. In the course of military exercises, more attention will be paid to medical support of military contingents, protection of servicemen from such threats, actions of military medical personnel and units in combat operations. We plan to work on these issues in more detail during the exercises.
— There is much talk now that our world will no longer be the same after the pandemic. How do you assess the future and what, in your opinion, will need to be changed in CSTO’s work?
— Indeed, some people say now that the pandemic will have a huge impact on all spheres of society and after it the world will never be the same again. Such statements were voiced by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and a number of other politicians. With all due respect to these authoritative statespersons, I see no reason for such overarching conclusions. Let us leave aside the philosophical statement about the immutability of human nature. Let us instead try to answer a more specific question: what lasting changes will occur in the world as far as CSTO’s activities go? Our organization is a military and political bloc. We are guided primarily by the international and regional military and political context. I do not see any convincing arguments that it will significantly change, much less change radically after the pandemic. Yes, there have been certain hopes and attempts to reduce the degree of military and political tension and aggression, to move away, at least for a while, from confrontation and to unite nations and national unions in the face of a common threat. Such initiatives were also proposed by Russia. But such appeals are not receiving a proper response from the world’s leaders. In other words, there is no reason to hope that after the pandemic the strategic goals of states, their approaches and the military and political situation on the international and regional scale will significantly change.
The same is true of the CSTO area of responsibility. Yes, the pandemic is leaving its mark. But what big changes occur in the Central Asian, Caucasian or Eastern European regions? In military and political terms, no significant changes are visible.
Undoubtedly, the pandemic will have a great negative impact on the economy and social sphere in most countries. To a varying extent, it will also affect the CSTO states. We need to take this into account and adjust the CSTO activities for the future.
Why? The social sphere and the economy are interconnected. It is obvious that economic decline will reduce the welfare and social security of a large number of citizens in many countries. Many more people around the world will lose their income and jobs. Of course, such situation is a breeding ground for drug trafficking and crime in general, for illegal migration, extremism and terrorist organizations. We at the CSTO must take into account the possible rise of these threats. This year we will conduct operations Kanal (“channel”), Nelegal (“illegal person”) and Naemnik (“mercenary”). Of course, we also need to think about the future, paying more attention to these threats. I am sure that these realities and assessments will be discussed at the upcoming CSTO CFM meeting on May 26.
— What is the status of the reinforcement of the border with Afghanistan to prevent terrorists from entering the territory of the CSTO states?
— The situation in the region and along the border remains tense. Currently, the threat of international terrorist organizations’ potential exploit of the certain features of the Tajik–Afghan section of the border to penetrate the territory of the CSTO states remains relevant. Today, Afghanistan is a place where terrorists of various persuasions, primarily those involved in conflicts in Syria, Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries, seek refuge. The terrorist organization called Islamic State,* which has achieved the greatest influence in the south-eastern provinces of Afghanistan, is no exception. Despite the measures taken by the government forces, a significant part of the Afghan territory is still controlled by armed gangs of the radical Islamic movement Taliban.
The aggravation of domestic political tensions following the September 2019 presidential elections is also having a negative impact on the situation in Afghanistan. The opposition’s struggle against the incumbent president significantly reduces the ability of the Afghan security forces to neutralize armed gangs and helps strengthen the influence of radical Islamist and terrorist groups.
In order to improve the situation in the region, on November 28, 2019 the CSTO Collective Security Council approved a List of Additional Measures Aimed at Diffusing Tension on the Tajik–Afghan Border. The document contains a set of political and military measures, as well as measures to counter challenges and threats to regional security. All of them are aimed at creating conditions for reinforcing the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, as well as for creating a stable and secure environment on the Tajik–Afghan border.
At the same time, in order to increase the potential of the border troops of the Republic of Tajikistan in that area with the participation of the Organization’s Member States, a draft CSTO Targeted Interstate Programme for Reinforcing Sections of the Tajik–Afghan Border is being developed. Draft proposals regarding the goals, objectives, timelines and stages of programme project formation have been agreed upon.
We believe that the implementation of measures in the List of Additional Measures Aimed at Diffusing Tension on the Tajik–Afghan Border, as well as the CSTO Targeted Interstate Programme for Reinforcing Sections of the Tajik–Afghan Border will have a positive impact on the issues related to strengthening the protection of the Tajik–Afghan section of the state border of the Republic of Tajikistan.
— Would a Russian military base in Belarus contribute to strengthening the CSTO security?
— This question primarily concerns the sphere of bilateral cooperation of Russia and Belarus. I would like to note that it develops very dynamically, according to the plan and is characterized by a developed system of interaction through the General Staffs, the armed forces and military educational institutions.
I deliberately touched upon the topic of interaction between military departments of the two countries, because it is directly related to the formation of the CSTO collective security system, one of the key elements of which is the Russia–Belarus regional group of troops (forces) in the Eastern European region of collective security. Its structure, composition, armament and military equipment, as well as combat capabilities ensure the resolution of all tasks in this area. Anti-aircraft defence of units and formations is carried out by the material and human resources of the Unified Regional Air Defence System of Russia and Belarus.
Therefore, and taking into account the current level of technological development, one may conclude that a high degree of readiness and mobility of troops intended for joint action make it possible to ensure military security in the Eastern European collective security region without deploying additional military infrastructure and establishing a Russian military base on the territory of Belarus. And as far as I know, the issue of deployment of a military base of the Russian Defence Ministry on the territory of Belarus is not on the political agenda of the two states at the moment.
— Will the CSTO airbase in Kyrgyzstan be reinforced?
— Russian Kant airbase on the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic was established in order to maintain peace and stability in the CSTO’s Central Asian collective security region, to exercise control over airspace and to ensure military security of the CSTO Member States, including the repulsion of external military aggression and air support for the CSTO Troops (Collective Forces) in the course of joint anti-terrorist operations.
By agreement with the authorized bodies, the airbase may be used for the tasks of joint air-defence combat duty. The wide range of these tasks clearly demonstrates how important the role of this aviation component is.
The airbase’s tasks are exercised on the basis of joint-training plans for command echelons and military personnel of the collective security system; it is widely used in the course of joint CSTO exercises in the region. Therefore, significant work is being done to improve the combat readiness of the airbase and flight skills of personnel and to develop infrastructure.
To this end, the runway is being reconstructed and the airfield’s navigation equipment is being improved, which makes it possible to reinforce the air group in the collective security region if necessary.
Special importance is attached to the technical equipment of the airbase. It has state-of-the art aviation equipment that will significantly expand the range and efficiency of tasks performed and increase the intensity of flight crew training.
Thus, the systematic strengthening of the Russian airbase as an aviation component of the Collective Rapid Deployment Force of the Central Asian region significantly expands the capacity to respond to various crises and contributes to peacekeeping and stability in the region.
— Does the CSTO consider the possibility of a military conflict with NATO? Are the Organization’s States preparing for such a risk?
— First of all, the CSTO’s goals are to strengthen peace, international and regional security and stability, to collectively protect the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of its Member States who give priority to political means for their achievement.
At the same time, according to Article 4 of the Treaty, if an aggression (an armed attack threatening safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty) is committed against one of the States Parties by any state or a group of states, it will be considered as an aggression (an armed attack threatening safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty) against all the States Parties to the CSTO.
As for the probability of a military conflict with NATO, there is no immediate threat of such a conflict. Even if there are differences of opinion, different approaches to addressing major international issues and challenges, there are no grounds for such a conflict. Moreover, we hope that the political elite and society of NATO states realize, like we do, the global disastrousness of such a conflict.

At the same time, the CSTO understands the complexity of the emerging military and political situation both on the European continent and in the world as a whole. Any situations related to its change are monitored and carefully analysed. The growth of NATO military power and infrastructure near the CSTO borders, the intensity and scale of joint manoeuvres (up to 40 major military exercises are held annually) inevitably cause concern.
All this objectively requires CSTO’s adequate response and constant readiness to respond to possible crisis situations. In this regard, political and diplomatic response measures are developed, the military component of the Organization is strengthened and continuous efforts are made to improve the combat capabilities of the CSTO Troops (Collective Forces) and their management system.
I would like to stress that all these measures are aimed exclusively at ensuring collective security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the CSTO Member States.
* A terrorist organization banned in Russia
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